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Abstract 
This paper investigates the trade-off between bank debt and trade credit for entrepreneurial 
start-ups.  Specifically, we examine how the lower cost of bank debt is  weighed against the more 
lenient  liquidation  policy  adopted  by  suppliers.  Both  the  riskiness  of the  venture  and  the 
entrepreneur's control rents  influence this  choice.  Using unique data on  325  first-time business 
start-ups, we  find that firms  in industries with high historical failure rates and entrepreneurs who 
value private control benefits use less bank debt.  These effects are even strengthened in case assets 
have a high liquidation value and thus banks are more likely to liquidate the firm following default. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
In most countries, business start-ups in traditional industrial sectors cannot access venture 
capital.  Especially  in  Continental  Europe,  venture  capitalists  still  largely  finance  firms  in the 
growth rather than the  start-up stage (e.g.,  Ooghe et aI.,  1991).  Also,  the use of venture capital 
tends to be restricted to  very specific industries, such as  biotechnology, software and  computers, 
telecommunications, etc.  In the U.S., for example, studies investigating venture capital financing 
principally  use  databases  of high-tech  firms,  such  as  firms  established  in  Silicon  Valley  (e.g., 
Davila et aI.,  2003).  Entrepreneurs  in traditional  industries  must thus  finance  their  assets  and 
operations mainly with debt.  The two major sources of debt financing are  bank loans  and trade 
credit.  Berger and Udell (1998), for instance, report that commercial banks and suppliers are the 
largest providers of debt financing for U.S.  firms  aged up  to  two years.  Similar conclusions are 
obtained when examining start-ups in Continental Europe (e.g.,  Huyghebaert and Van de  Gucht, 
2002).  Furthermore, Cook (1999) and Fisman and Love (2003) show that implicit borrowing in the 
form of trade credit constitutes an important source of funding  for  firms  with difficult access to 
financial markets. 
Trade credit, however, is considered to be an expensive financing source.  The credit term 
most frequently adopted by suppliers is "2/10 net 30" (Ng et aI., 1999).  This term represents a two-
percent discount for payment within the ten-day discount period; the net period ends  on day 30. 
The implicit interest rate on trade credit under this term amounts to 43.9%.  Similarly, Cook (1999) 
reports that for small Russian firms, the average interest rate on trade loans amounts to 58%.  Bank 
loans are typically a cheaper form of debt financing (e.g., Wilson and Summers, 2002).  Based on 
the explicit cost alone, entrepreneurs should prefer bank financing.  Yet, most firms use both forms 
of debt financing,  and  entrepreneurs  use  even more  trade  credit than established  firms.  Cunat 
(2002),  for  instance,  documents that trade  credit represents  34% of total debt in small-sized US 
firms;  this percentage is  even higher for small-sized UK firms.  Also, Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
find that bank credit constrained small firms make up the shortage of funds by raising more trade 
3 credit.  These observations suggest that bank debt and trade credit differ not only with respect to 
cost but also on other dimensions. 
This paper examines how entrepreneurial firms choose between bank debt and trade credit. 
Besides the cost differential, we take into account that a major difference between bank debt and 
trade credit is the liquidation policy that is  followed by these lenders when borrowers encounter 
financial difficulties.  Banks tend to  follow strict liquidation policies when debtors get financially 
distressed:  if upon default a firm's liquidation value exceeds its going concern value,  banks will 
liquidate the firm (see also Diamond,  1991; Chemmanur and Fulghieri,  1994).  Suppliers, on the 
other hand,  earn rents  from  selling  goods  to  their customers.  If a  customer is  liquidated upon 
default, such supplier rents are lost.  Thus, as  argued by Petersen and Rajan (1997), suppliers have 
an implicit equity stake in their customers and therefore are more willing than banks to renegotiate 
their claims when debtors get into financial problems.  In other words, suppliers may be willing to 
reorganize  even when the  firm's  liquidation value exceeds  its  going concern value.!  Similarly, 
Wilner (2000)  argues  that  suppliers  are  more  dependent  on their  customers  than  credit market 
lenders whereas Franks and Nyborg (1996) point out that sunk investments in the customer-buyer 
relationship also make suppliers more lenient towards financially distressed buyers.2  For first-time 
business  start-ups,  which  are  the  firms  examined  in  this  paper,  this  issue  of differences  in 
liquidation policy cannot be  ignored.  The reason is  that these  firms  face  relatively high failure 
rates,  at  least when compared to  more established firms.  Since these  firms  have no  history, the 
driving forces behind their debt choice can also be disentangled more easily. 
In this paper, we argue that entrepreneurs trade off the lower cost of bank debt against the 
more lenient liquidation policy of suppliers.  We hypothesize that this trade-off is  influenced by 
three  factors:  the  quality  of the  venture,  the  entrepreneur's  private  benefits  of control  and  the 
liquidation value of firm assets.  Entrepreneurs with ventures that have a high probability of success 
1 An alternative way to look at this issue is that, because of supplier rents, the going concern value of the firm is higher 
to the supplier than to the bank.  As a result, suppliers are more lenient with financially distressed firms. 
4 are  less likely to  default and thus  are  primarily interested in minimizing debt  expenses.  These 
entrepreneurs therefore predominantly raise bank debt at the  moment of start-up.  Entrepreneurs 
with risky ventures, on the other hand, restrict their bank debt so  as  to  avoid defaulting on their 
bank loan.  These entrepreneurs are willing to  accept the higher trade credit rates so  as  to  benefit 
from the supplier's lenient liquidation policy and reduce the chance of liquidation once financial 
distress  occurs.  This  trade-off is  further  influenced  by  the  entrepreneur's  private  benefits  of 
control, i.e. the various non-pecuniary aspects related to managing one's own firm.  In the case of 
liquidation, entrepreneurs lose these private control rents.  Thus, entrepreneurs with higher private 
benefits of control are more reluctant to expose their firm to the bank's strict liquidation policy and 
adjust their choice of debt instruments  accordingly.  Finally,  the  trade-off is  determined by the 
firm's liquidation value.  If  assets have a high liquidation value, the firm's liquidation value is more 
likely to  exceed its going concern value  following  default.  Then, banks will liquidate the  firm, 
which entrepreneurs  of lower quality  ventures  and  entrepreneurs  who  value  private  benefits  of 
control take into account when determining their mix of  bank and trade credit at start-up. 
We examine these conjectures using a unique sample of 325  Belgian entrepreneurial start-
ups.  These  firms  are  first-time  business  start-ups  in  traditional  manufacturing  industries, 
established in 1992.  We study these firms' debt choice during the first operating year.  Our dataset 
is  unique in that it contains financial  and accounting data of first-time  entrepreneurial firms.  In 
most countries, accounting data on privately held firms  is  scarce,  and is  usually restricted to  the 
larger firms  such as  in the Federal Reserve Board's National Survey of Small Business Finances 
(NSSBF), so  that these datasets are not representative for start-ups firms  (e.g., Ang et ai.,  2000). 
We find that entrepreneurs in industries with high historical start-up failure rates and entrepreneurs 
who highly value private benefits of control use less bank debt.  We show that these effects  are 
even stronger when the start-up firm is likely to have a high liquidation value.  In sum, these results 
2  For newly established entrepreneurial ventures, the latter argument does not apply at the moment of start-up, but is 
likely to become more important over time, as the supplier-buyer relationship is being developed. 
5 support the  argument that  entrepreneurs trade  off the  lower cost of bank debt  against the  more 
lenient liquidation policy of  the supplier. 
This paper proceeds as  follows.  First, we discuss the choice between bank debt and trade 
credit from the point of view of entrepreneurs who wish to minimize their financing expenses and 
simultaneously retain control over their firm.  Second, we describe our sample of entrepreneurial 
business start-ups.  Thereafter, we discuss our empirical results on the determinants of  the debt mix 
and offer our conclusions. 
THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN BANK DEBT AND TRADE CREDIT 
The external financing sources available to  entrepreneurial firms  are typically restricted to 
bank loans and supplier credit.  Of these two alternatives, bank debt is the cheapest while suppliers 
adopt more lenient liquidation policies. 
Specifically, banks operate in a highly competitive market.  To illustrate, the net interest 
margin in Europe decreased by 8.73% during the eighties and by 31.67% between 1990 and 1998 
(OECD, 2001).  This  increased competition was mainly caused by deregulation (e.g., Remolona 
and Wulfekuhler, 1992; Benink and Llewellyn, 1994).  As a result, banks earn only small margins 
on their loan portfolios and thus have only a limited 'implicit equity stake' in firms  that default. 
This likely explains why bank loans are difficult to renegotiate and banks pursue strict liquidation 
policies.  According to Carey et al.  (1998), banks develop a reputation for being a tough creditor, 
which enables them to  reduce adverse selection problems, i.e.  reduce the  number of low-quality 
firms  that apply for  a bank loan.  By adopting strict liquidation policies, banks  can protect their 
reputational  capital.  Also,  if banks  can reduce  adverse  selection  problems  by  being  a  tough 
creditor, the likelihood that banks will be held liable by other creditors for  having given a false 
signal about firm quality is reduced. 
Suppliers, on the other hand, tend to  be more lenient towards financially distressed firms. 
Consistent with this argument, Franks and Sussman (2000) find that banks are very harsh in debt 
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of distress, even when it ends in formal bankruptcy.  Evans (1998) further finds that trade creditors 
grant more concessions to customers in financial distress than banks do.  In the literature, different 
arguments have been put forward to explain why suppliers tend to  be more lenient.  Petersen and 
Rajan (1997), for instance, argue that suppliers have an implicit equity stake in their customers and 
therefore are  more willing than banks to  renegotiate their claims when debtors  get into financial 
problems.  For unlike banks,  suppliers have a product market relationship with the entrepreneur. 
Consequently, if the reorganization is successful, suppliers earn profits on the future goods sold to 
the reorganized firm.  Similarly, Wilner (2000) argues that suppliers are more dependent on their 
customers  than  credit  market  lenders  whereas  Franks  and  Nyborg  (1996)  point  out  that  sunk 
investments  in  the  customer-buyer  relationship  also  make  suppliers  more  lenient  towards 
financially  distressed buyers.  Because  suppliers  follow  more  lenient  liquidation policies,  trade 
credit is  riskier than bank loans.  This  argument  likely explains  why trade  credit is  also  more 
expensive  (see  also  Cunat  (2002),  who  argues  that  trade  credit  is  more  expensive  because  it 
includes a default premium).  In the  next section,  we  develop  testable hypotheses  based on the 
above arguments relating to the trade-off between bank debt and trade credit. 
HYPOTHESES 
Central  in  all  definitions  of entrepreneurship  is  that  an  entrepreneur  is  someone  who 
assumes risks (e.g., Bruyat and Julien, 2001).  Not surprisingly, business start-ups face high failure 
rates.  Dun &  Bradstreet (1994), for instance, document that approximately 50% of all firms that 
failed in  1993  did so in the first five years of their existence.  Likewise, of all Belgian firms  that 
went bankrupt in 2002, 41.04% was younger than five  years.  When deciding on their financing 
mix,  entrepreneurs  likely take  the  perceived quality  of their venture  into  account,  as  we  argue 
hereafter. 
7 High-quality entrepreneurial firms have a high probability that they will be able to  generate 
the required cash flows to payoff their debt outstanding.  Entrepreneurs with high-quality ventures 
thus are unlikely to  default on their debt and hence unlikely to lose their private control benefits. 
To finance their assets and operations at start-up, these entrepreneurs therefore choose the cheapest 
debt alternative, which is a bank loan. 
Entrepreneurs with low-quality ventures, on the other hand,  are  more likely to  default on 
their debt.  If these entrepreneurs finance their assets and operations entirely with bank debt, they 
are likely to lose their control rents once the cash flows are insufficient to cover the debt payments. 
For these  entrepreneurs, the  loss  of private control benefits thus  poses  a real threat,  which they 
cannot ignore.  Hence, these entrepreneurs limit the size of their bank loan.  To at least partially 
benefit from the lower bank cost, they still raise some bank debt at start-up and determine the size 
of the bank loan such that the bank debt can still be paid off even when the firm's performance 
turns out the be poor.  Then, the entrepreneurial firm will default only on its trade credit and might 
be able to survive temporary cash flow problems.  The reason is that the trade debt is more likely to 
be renegotiated following default.  These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurs of  high-quality ventures prefer to finance more with bank debt, 
ceteris paribus. 
It is  commonly accepted that entrepreneurs typically enjoy significant private benefits of control. 
Hamilton (2000), for instance, finds  that some entrepreneurs enter and persist in business despite 
lower earnings and earnings growth than in paid employment, from which he  concludes that the 
non-pecuniary benefits of self-employment can be considerable.  Examples of such non-pecuniary 
benefits include the prestige and status that comes with ownership as well as the power to decide on 
the business strategy of  the firm, the feeling of having one's own future in hands and independence 
from superiors (e.g., Mueller, 2003).  However, there may still be quite some variability in the level 
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when  their  venture  fails  whereas  others  may  have  easier  access  to  alternative  employment. 
Entrepreneurs  who  highly  value  control  rights,  as  a result,  are  likely  to  worry  more  about  the 
liquidation of their firm following default.  We therefore expect these entrepreneurs to  limit their 
bank debt at the time of start-up. 
Hypothesis 2: Entrepreneurs with higher private benefits of  control prefer to finance more 
with trade credit, ceteris paribus. 
If the firm has a high liquidation value, the bank is more likely to liquidate the venture upon default 
on its debt.  The reason is that in that case, the firm's liquidation value is likely to exceed its value 
as a going concern.  Given that the implicit equity stake of banks in debtors is  limited, banks put 
the lowest value on firms continuing as a going concern following default.  For entrepreneurs with 
low-quality ventures or large private benefits of control, this is particularly worrisome.  As a result, 
these  entrepreneurs  are  even  more  reluctant  to  finance  exclusively  with  bank  debt  at  start-up. 
These arguments result in the following conjecture: 
Hypothes is 3: Entrepreneurs of  firms with a high liquidation value prefer to finance partly 
with  trade credit,  especially when  the quality of their venture  is  low or control rents  are 
highly valued. 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
This section empirically investigates the determinants of the debt mix for business start-ups 
as  set forth in the above hypotheses.  For this purpose, we use data on a unique sample of newly 
established  entrepreneurial  ventures  in  Belgium.  We  were  able  to  construct  this  data  set  of 
entrepreneurial  start-ups  because  of  the  reporting  requirements  imposed  by  the  Belgian 
9 government.  Most  countries  do  not  require  unlisted  firms  to  make  their  financial  statements 
available  to  the  public.  For the  U.S.,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board's National  Survey  of Small 
Business  Finances  provides  financial  information on 4,637  privately held  firms,  but Ang  et al. 
(2000)  report  that  mean  firm  age  in  this  database  is  17.6  years.  As  a  result,  NSSBF  is  not 
representative  for  start-up  firms.  In  Belgium,  however,  all  limited  liability  firms  - except for 
financial institutions, insurance companies, exchange brokers and hospitals - are legally required to 
file annual accounts with the National Bank as of start-up ..  In addition, these firms have to publish 
an abstract from their foundation charter in the Government Newspaper (Staatsblad).  Each firm 
receives a unique and chronologically accorded Value Added Tax number the first time it registers 
with the tax authorities.  This VAT number allowed us to identify newly established firms and their 
financial  statements  in  the  database  of the  National  Bank.  We  also  collected  the  financial 
statements of  the incumbent firms in the corresponding four-digit NACE industry. 
We identified 652 limited liability firms,  founded in the manufacturing industry in  1992. 
This  sector was  selected because of its  higher optimal scale of operations;  entrepreneurs in this 
sector may therefore lack the personal financial resources to fully finance all assets and operations 
at start-up.  This sample was subsequently cleaned to remove all firms that were not entrepreneurial 
start-ups.  Using  the  foundation  charter,  "true" business  start-ups  could  be  distinguished  from 
newly established subsidiaries of existing firms,  split-ups,  spin-offs,  etc.  Firms arising from the 
incorporation of a previously self-employed activity, identified through follow-up phone calls, were 
also  removed from  the  sample.  Lastly,  firms  with missing values  for  the  variables used in the 
regression models were also deleted.  The final sample consists of 325 business start-ups, which are 
active in 97 different manufacturing industries, based on their four-digit NACE code.  The industry 
distribution of  the sample firms is reported in Table 1. 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample firms.  The average firm has total 
financing sources of €258,257 in the start-up year.  Since total assets on average are less than total 
financing sources, the average firm incurs accounting losses during the start-up year.  The start-ups 
10 are highly levered: on average, 69.97% of the initial financing sources are raised as  external debt 
(median of 78.21 %).3  Debt is hereby defined as  the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities. 
Bank debt on average represents 33.60% of total debt, whereas trade credit accounts for 31.07%.4 
Given the importance of trade credit,  it  is  not surprising that the majority of debt is  short-term: 
62.67% of total debt matures within one year.  On average, 22.21 % of bank debt matures within 
one year.  Finally, initial ownership is highly concentrated: the average number of shareholders is 
2.42 whereas the average Herfindah1 shareholder concentration index amounts to 64.80%. 
******************* 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 
******************* 
METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
In this section, we investigate how the variable Debt mix (= bank debt/total debt) depends 
upon the variables discussed above:  1) quality of  the entrepreneurial venture,  2) private benefits of 
control, and  3)  the firm's liquidation value.  Following Houston and James (1996) and Johnson 
(1998) who also investigate the fraction of debt that consists of bank loans, we include variables 
that control for  growth opportunities, profitability and firm  size.  To take  into  account that the 
dependent variable might be censored, we use Tobit regression analysis. 
The following Tobit model is estimated: 
Debt mix = /30 + /31  venture quality + /32 private benefits of control 
+ /33 liquidation value + /34 growth opportunities + /35 profitability 
+ /36 firm size  (1) 
3 Huyghebaert (2000) argues that the loans entrepreneurs extend to their firm resemble preferred equity rather than debt 
financing.  Entrepreneurs are unlikely to  voluntarily file  for bankruptcy when only the debt service payments on their 
own loans can no longer be met.  Unlike the U.S., the Belgian bankruptcy law is creditor oriented, so that debtors have 
no incentive to seek protection under it. 
4  The other important component of debt is  current wages.  In Belgium,  it  is  uncommon for  employees to  file  for 
bankruptcy once their wages are not paid. 
11 The explanatory variables are  not directly observable and hence must be proxied.  The  variable 
measurements are especially complicated by the nature of the sample firms.  Using firm level data 
from the start-up year might lead to  an endogeneity problem.  For instance, firms that are  able to 
show high growth figures as  of start-up may be the ones that have had easier access to bank debt. 
Likewise, firms with a high liquidation value may have been those that used more of the cheaper 
bank debt to finance their assets.  To avoid this type of endogeneity problem, other studies often 
use the firm specific variables observed in the previous year.  However, for first-time business start-
ups, there simply are no data prior to the start-up year.  Hence, we must resort to industry variables 
for some of  the proxies. 
Individual venture quality is unobservable at the time of start-up.  We therefore assume that 
venture quality is  industry specific and related to the success of prior start-ups.  Average venture 
quality is  calculated per four-digit industry as  the proportion of start-up firms  founded  in 1988-
1991 that survived within the first three years after start-up. 
Private benefits of control are difficult to measure.  Studies on listed firms  (e.g., Demsetz 
and Lehn,  1985;  Agrawal and Nagarajan,  1990) usually measure them by the  firm's  ownership 
structure  and  more  specifically  by  the  level  of managerial  stockholdings.  These  studies  thus 
assume that when ownership is  highly concentrated in the hands of the firm's  management,  the 
latter has a larger influence on the firm's decisions and strategy.  However, and as already shown in 
Table  2,  in the  case  of start-ups  shareholdings  are  all  highly  concentrated in  the  hands  of the 
original founder  and his  family,  and hence  exhibit little  cross-sectional variability.  This  study, 
therefore,  must use  another  measure  for  control  rents.  To  ensure  that  our  conclusions  do  not 
depend on a measure that has not been well validated yet, we construct three proxy variables.  First, 
we use the  1991  unemployment rate in the corresponding four-digit industry to  proxy for private 
benefits of control.  In industries where the unemployment rate  is  relatively high,  entrepreneurs 
who fail in their venture may have a hard time in finding a new job.  These entrepreneurs, therefore, 
are likely to attribute a higher value to managing their own firm.  Second, we use industry-adjusted 
12 entrepreneurial  wages.  Entrepreneurs  who pay themselves  wages  above  the  industry  norm  are 
likely to have more impact on the fim1's decisions and strategy, resulting in larger private benefits 
of control.  Since the  income statement only reports  total wages, we use  the  average  wage per 
employee.  To control for  industry effects, we divide by the  corresponding industry average for 
1991.5  Third, we construct a (firm level) dummy variable that reflects the type of incorporation.  In 
Belgium, limited liability firms can choose among several legal forms.  One of these forms, N.V. 
structure,  grants  entrepreneurs more contractual freedom regarding board structure and dividend 
policy, and is  considered to be more prestigious by owners.  Entrepreneurs who choose the N.V. 
corporate form at start-up, therefore, likely enjoy higher control rents.  The dummy variable equals 
one when the firm is founded as an N.V. and zero otherwise. 
The  liquidation value  of firm  assets  is  measured by the  ratio  of tangible  assets  to  total 
assets, averaged across all industry incumbents in 1991.  When assets are highly tangible, they are 
less  likely  to  be  very  firm  specific  and  thus  tend  to  have  a  higher  market  value.  Growth 
opportunities again must be measured in the year prior to start-up; they are captured by the average 
industry sales growth rate over the period 1988-1991.  Profitability is measured by EBITDA over 
total assets, averaged across all incumbents in the corresponding four-digit NACE industry in 1991. 
Finally, firm size is proxied by log(total financing sources). 
Table 3 provides summary information on these proxy variables.  To limit the influence of 
extreme observations upon our results, all explanatory variables, except for the  dummy variables, 
are  winsorized  at  the  5%-95%  level.  Finally,  to  control  for  other  industry  determinants  not 
captured by  our model,  we  add  industry  dummy  variables  to  the  model  of equation  (1 ).  We 
construct an industry dummy variable for each four-digit industry with more than ten start-ups.  As 
is  customary  in  the  literature,  the  reported  results  do  not  show  the  corresponding  parameter 
estimates for these industry dummy variables. 
5 Another approach could have been to  look at the dividends that were paid out.  However, less than 5% of the firms 
distribute dividends in the start-up year. 
l3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
************** 
Insert Table 3 
************** 
The results of the Tobit estimations are presented in Table 4.  The various models in Panels 
A  and  B  differ  only  with  respect  to  the  measurement  of private  benefits  of control:  the 
unemployment rate  in Model  I, the  industry-adjusted wage ratio in Model 2,  and the legal form 
dummy  in Model 3.  To test our third hypothesis,  we  add an  interaction term between venture 
quality, respectively control rents and liquidation value in Panel B. 
The results in Panel A show that entrepreneurs in industries with high historical failure rates 
raise a lower fraction of bank debt as  of start-up, ceteris paribus.  This negative sign is  consistent 
with Hypothesis 1 and confirms that entrepreneurs of lower quality ventures wish to raise a lower 
proportion of bank debt at start-up in order to minimize the liquidation probability.  Alternatively, 
entrepreneurs  of high-quality  ventures  raise  a  larger  fraction  of bank  debt  to  minimize  their 
financing expenses. 
Entrepreneurs  with larger control rents  significantly reduce the  fraction  of total  external 
debt that is raised as  bank debt, ceteris paribus.  A comparison of Models  1 through 3 shows that 
this conclusion holds for all proxies of private benefits of control.  These results thus support our 
second hypothesis: entrepreneurs who highly value private benefits of control consider not only the 
cheaper price of bank debt,  but also  take  into  account the  stricter bank liquidation policy when 
deciding on their debt mix at start-up. 
When the liquidation value of  firm assets is high, it is more likely to exceed the firm's going 
concern value  following default.  Firms with a high  asset liquidation value,  therefore,  are  more 
likely to be liquidated by their bank following default.  The results in Panel A,  however, indicate 
that  the  relation  between  the  liquidation  value,  measured  by  the  industry  average  of tangible 
assets/total assets, and the proportion of bank debt is not significant.  In our third hypothesis, we 
14 argue that especially  entrepreneurs of low-quality ventures  and entrepreneurs who  highly value 
private benefits of control are concerned about liquidation following default.  Consistent with this 
argument, the results in Panel B show that the interaction term between start-up failure  rate  and 
liquidation value is  significant at the  10%  level.  Likewise, the  interaction term between control 
rents and liquidation value is negative and significant.  This table also indicates that venture quality 
only significantly influences the debt choice for start-up firms with high liquidation values since we 
find  that  the  single  term  measuring venture  quality  (i.e.,  the  start-up  failure  rate)  is  no  longer 
significant in Panel B.  Entrepreneurs with high private benefits of control use  significantly less 
bank debt, and this  effect is  even stronger for those firms  with high liquidation values.  In  sum, 
these findings thus support our third hypothesis. 
Finally, we find that growth opportunities as measured by the industry sales growth rate do 
not affect the  debt mix.  This  result contrasts with the  negative relation found  by Houston and 
James (1996) for firms with single banking relationships.  They interpret their finding as  showing 
that  especially  firms  with large  growth  opportunities  may suffer  from  bank hold-up  problems, 
which high-growth firms  circumvent by  limiting the  proportion of bank debt in their financing 
structure.  A potential explanation for our diverging results could be that Houston and James use a 
sample of large, publicly quoted firms.  These firms  can more easily access alternative financing 
sources,  such  as  public  debt,  to  finance  available  growth  opportunities  than  the  entrepreneurial 
firms in our sample, resulting in a negative relation between growth opportunities and bank debt in 
their sample.  Next,  in industries with high internal cash flow  generation,  start-up  firms  raise a 
larger amount of bank debt,  ceteris paribus.  This  relation is  consistent with the  literature (e.g., 
John,  1998; Carey et at.,  1999), but in our sample it is  unclear whether this relation is  driven by 
entrepreneurs in highly profitable industries having a greater confidence in their venture's quality 
(demand driven) or by banks that are prepared to finance a larger fraction of assets and operations 
in  industries  with  large,  stable  cash  flows  (supply  driven).  Lastly,  we  find  that  firm  size  is 
positively and significantly related to  the proportion of external debt that consists of bank loans. 
15 The positive sign again is  inconsistent with the literature on  large, publicly quoted firms,  which 
obtain easier access to public debt markets as they grow larger and realize more stable cash flows. 
We conclude this  section with  an  important caveat,  which  was  already  hinted at  in  the 
previous paragraph:  our paper essentially looks  at  demand driven determinants  of the  debt mix 
structure in entrepreneurial start-ups.  Of course, supply side considerations will also influence the 
debt mix that is ultimately observed and some of the relations we document could also result from 
such supply side factors.  Take the example of  the negative relation between the start-up failure rate 
and the debt mix.  Another explanation, based on a supply side argument, for this negative relation 
is that banks are only willing to finance a limited fraction of  the assets and operations of start-ups in 
industries with relatively high default risk.  This argument is further elaborated on in Huyghebaert 
and Van de  Gucht (2002).  Nevertheless,  the  negative  relation between the  various  proxies  for 
entrepreneurial control rents and the fraction of debt that consists of bank loans is  unlikely to be 
driven  by  such  a  supply  side  argument.  Therefore,  our  paper  is  the  first  to  show  that  the 
entrepreneur's motivations and concerns affect the financing decisions of business start-ups, a side 
of  the decision that has been ignored in the (empirical) finance literature up till now. 
CONCLUSIONS 
************* 
Insert Table 4 
************* 
The main conclusion of this paper is  that entrepreneurs who contract debt to  finance their 
venture  at  start-up  not only  consider the  price  of the  different  credit types;  they  also  take  into 
account the  differences  in  liquidation policy of banks  and  suppliers.  We  argue  and  show  that 
especially  entrepreneurs  of low-quality  ventures  and  entrepreneurs  who  highly  value  private 
benefits of control determine their debt mix such as to avoid a later default on their bank debt; i.e., 
they use less bank debt.  For these entrepreneurs, the loss of control rents following default does 
16 not offset the lower financing expenses when borrowing exclusively from the bank.  Furthermore, 
we show that in industries with highly tangible assets, these effects are even stronger.  The latter 
finding is consistent with the idea that especially when the liquidation value of the firm exceeds its 
going  concern value,  banks  are  going to  liquidate the  firm  following  default.  Further research 
could now link the results of our study to the post-entry survival of entrepreneurial start-ups, taking 
into account the conditions under which banks tend to  follow  strict liquidation policies.  Up  till 
now, studies investigating post-entry survival (e.g., Huyghebaert et aI., 2000) have documented that 
both start-ups that are largely bank debt financed and firms that raise more trade credit at start-up 
have higher failure rates.  The results of  this paper could help to refine the driving forces behind the 
relation between start-up financing and subsequent failure. 
17 Table 1: Industry distribution of  manufacturing start-ups 
This table displays the industry distribution of the start-up finns, based on their four-digit NACE industry code.  All 
sample firms are incorporated in Belgium and start their operations in the manufacturing industry in 1992.  The sample 
is  constructed from the Belgian National Bank database.  Based on the foundation charter and follow-up phone calls, 
only true entrepreneurial start-ups are retained in the sample. 
NACE code  description  number of firms 
2200-2299  Production and preliminary processing of metals  1 
2300-2399  Extraction of  minerals other than metalliferous and  1 
energy-producing minerals; peat extraction 
2400-2499  Manufacture of  non-metallic mineral products  7 
2500-2599  Chemical industry  5 
3100-3199  Manufacture of  metal articles (except for mechanical,  16 
electrical and instrument engineering and vehicles) 
3200-3299  Mechanical engineering  8 
3400-3499  Electrical engineering  13 
3600-3699  Manufacture of other means of  transport  4 
3700-3799  Instrument engineering  15 
4100-4299  Food, drink and tobacco industry  51 
4300-4399  Textile industry  19 
4400-4499  Leather and leather goods industry (except footwear and  4 
clothing) 
4500-4599  Footwear and clothing industry  26 
4600-4699  Timber and wooden furniture industries  34 
4700-4799  Manufacture of  paper and paper products; printing and  97 
publishing 
4800-4899  Processing of  rubber and plastics  6 
4900-4999  Other manufacturing industries  18 
TOTAL  325 firms 
18 Table 2:  Summary statistics of firm characteristics in the start-up year 
This Table presents  summary  statistics  on  variables  that  represent firm  start-up  size,  initial  financial  structure  and 
ownership structure for the sample of 325  firms  that were founded in  1992.  Firm start-up size is  measured as  total 
financing sources, respectively total assets.  Leverage is  the  ratio of external debt to  total financing sources.  Initial 
financing sources do  not incorporate the operational results realized of the first year, whereas loans provided by the 
entrepreneurs to  their firm are  considered as  equity.  Short-term debt consists of debt maturing within one year,  and 
shareholder concentration is measured by the Herfindahl shareholder concentration index. 
Variable  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximu  Std. dev 
ST  ART  -UP SIZE 
Total financing sources (€)  258,257  106,322  4,908  8,505,103  611,214 
Total assets (€)  246,326  105,528  2,454  8,505,896  596,021 
INITIAL FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
Leverage  0.6997  0.7821  0  0.9930  0.2418 
Bank debt/total debt  0.3360  0.3213  0  1.0000  0.2962 
Trade credit/total debt  0.3107  0.2491  0  1  0.2626 
Short-term debt/total debt  0.6267  0.6388  0  1  0.3077 
Short-term bank debt/bank debt  0.2221  0  0  1  0.3402 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
N umber of shareholders  2.4244  2  1  9  1.1584 
Shareholder concentration  0.6480  0.5008  0.1534  1  0.2704 
19 Table 3: Summary statistics of  the explanatory variables 
This Table presents the summary statistics of the explanatory variables.  Start-up failure rate is the proportion of prior 
start-ups that failed within the first three years after start-up, calculated per four-digit industry over the period 1988-
1991.  Unemployment rate is the unemployment rate in the corresponding four-digit industry for 1991, the year prior to 
start-up.  Industry-adjusted wage ratio is the ratio of the wage per employee at the firm level relative to  the average 
wage  in  the  corresponding  industry.  Legal form  dummy  equals  one  if the  type  of incorporation  is  N.V.  and  zero 
otherwise.  Tangible assets/total assets is the percentage of total assets that is property, plant and equipment, averaged 
across industry incumbents for  1991.  Growth opportunities are measured by  the  average industry sales growth rate 
over the period 1988-199l.  Profitability is  measured as  1991  EBITDA to  total assets per four-digit NACE industry. 
Firm size is the logarithm of total financing sources (in thousands) in the start-up year. 
Variable  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Std. dey 
VENTURE OUALITY 
Start-up failure rate  0.0568  0.0516  0  0.5  0.0484 
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL 
Unemployment rate  0.1030  0.0851  0.0222  0.4262  0.0629 
Industry-adjusted wage ratio  0.8540  0.7847  0.1610  2.0419  0.9508 
Legal form dummy  0.3232  0  0  1  0.4695 
LIQUIDATION VALUE 
Tangible assets/total assets  0.7089  0.7171  0.2752  0.8767  0.1303 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Growth opportunities  0.1781  0.1520  -0.4619  1.1986  0.1691 
Profitability  0.3727  0.4250  0.0010  0.1239  0.1744 
Firm size  8.3508  8.3563  4.5951  12.7459  1.2392 
20 Table 4: Tobit regression results on start-up financial structure 
The dependent variable Debt mix is the proportion of  total external debt that consists of  bank loans.  Models 1 through 3 
differ with respect to the proxy used for control rents: the unemployment rate in Modell, the industry-adjusted wage 
ratio in Model 2, the legal form dummy in Model 3.  The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3. 
PANEL A 
Modell  Model 2  Model 3 
(unemployment rate)  (ind-adj. wage ratio)  (legal form dummy) 
parameter  p-va1ue  parameter  p-va1ue  parameter  p-va1ue 
estimate  estimate  estimate 
Intercept  -0.5032  0.0479  -0.6460  0.0062  -0.9561  0.0001 
Start-up failure rate  -1.1585  0.0233  -1.0595  0.0322  -0.9859  0.0450 
Control rents  -0.6683  0.0587  -0.1764  0.0003  -0.2365  0.0001 
Liquidation value  -0.1490  0.3942  -0.0980  0.5580  -0.1378  0.4086 
Growth Opportunities  0.0733  0.5573  0.0931  0.4445  0.1263  0.2983 
Profitability  0.3390  0.0118  0.3766  0.0045  0.2844  0.0311 
Firm size  0.0970  0.0001  0.1149  0.0001  0.1452  0.0001 
Log-likelihood  -162.6341  -157.9346  -153.7728 
PANELB 
Modell  Model 2  Model 3 
(unemployment rate)  (ind.-adj. wage ratio)  (legal form dummy) 
parameter  p-va1ue  parameter  p-va1ue  parameter  p-value 
estimate  estimate  estimate 
Intercept  -0.6611  0.0077  -0.5907  0.0123  -1.0432  0.0001 
Start-up failure rate  -0.5686  0.2774  -0.5549  0.2898  -0.4547  0.3731 
Start-up failure rate *  -7.3985  0.0651  -7.4211  0.0647  -7.7648  0.0651 
Liquidation value 
Control rents  -0.7102  0.0399  -0.1766  0.0002  -0.2013  0.0001 
Control rents *  -0.2639  0.0001  -0.0113  0.0378  -0.2078  0.0001 
Liquidation value 
Liquidation value  0.1804  0.3244  0.0825  0.6363  0.1500  0.4010 
Growth Opportunities  0.0764  0.5292  0.0773  0.5246  0.1310  0.2724 
Profitability  0.3534  0.0068  0.3555  0.0066  0.2995  0.0206 
Firm size  0.1112  0.0001  0.1107  0.0001  0.1490  0.0001 
Log-likelihood  -152.49  -152.90  -146.72 
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